Technological University Dublin

ARROW@TU Dublin
Dissertations

School of Computer Sciences

2018

A Demographic Analysis to Determine User Vulnerability among
Several Categories of Phishing Attacks.
Robert Griffin
Technological University Dublin

Follow this and additional works at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/scschcomdis
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Griffin, Robert (2018). A demographic analysis to determine user vulnerability among several categories
of phishing attacks. Masters dissertation, DIT, 2018.

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open
access by the School of Computer Sciences at
ARROW@TU Dublin. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
ARROW@TU Dublin. For more information, please
contact arrow.admin@tudublin.ie,
aisling.coyne@tudublin.ie.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License

A demographic analysis to determine user
vulnerability among several categories of phishing
attacks.

Robert Griffin
C11473422

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Dublin Institute of
Technology for the degree of M.Sc. in Computing (Security and Forensics)

June 2018

i

Abstract
Phishing attacks have been on a meteoric rise in the last number of years, with 2016 seeing a
65% increase. The attacks range from targeting individuals with personalised messages to spam
attacks from bot accounts. With the chances of being targeted by a phishing attack increasing,
it is important to identify who is most at risk in order to help alleviate this threat.
The aim of this study is to examine members from several demographics and their vulnerability
to three types of phishing using data collected from a survey (n = 198). The survey tested the
participant’s ability to recognise spoofed phishing emails, SMS phishing (Smishing) and
content spoofing attacks. The respondents were presented with questions in the form of
screenshots using real world phishing examples. Their answers were collected which recorded
whether they got each question correct or incorrect. The data collected was analysed using a
two sample t-test or one-way Anova depending on the number of categories per demographic.
This study addressed demographic vulnerability to different types of phishing and highlighted
who is most at risk. The results of the research revealed that gender and income did not play a
part in a participant’s vulnerability to phishing when analysing their total scores across each
type of phishing. However, age, education and occupation presented statistically significant
results to indicate they do.
Keywords: Phishing; Demographics; Vulnerability; Survey
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Introduction

1.1 Background
As technology advances, there is a greater reliance on the internet for people to conduct
business and socialise. This advancement in technology has also resulted in
cybercriminals following the trend as there is an increased risk of users being the target
of fraud (Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor, 2007). One of the main types of internet fraud is
phishing which “is a form of social engineering attack in which phishers, i.e. attackers,
trick the victim to fraudulently obtain private information” (Darwish, Zarka, & Aloul,
2013). The information collected by these attacks “can be used in identity theft, to
remove funds from a customer account, and in theft of online resources” (Wardman,
2016). Phishing has been a growing problem for internet users and organisations as
methods to deceive users and gain sensitive information have become more
commonplace and sophisticated (Anti-Phishing Working Group, 2017). Furthermore,
the Anti-Phishing Working Group’s 2016 report observed that “2016 ended as the worst
year for phishing in history with 1.2 million attacks, 65% more than 2015”. As phishing
becomes more of a problem, the reasons why people fall victim to these exploits are
examined. The psychology behind why the attacks succeed and who fall for them need
to be further explored.
As part of the initial research for this project, a survey study of twenty-three cyber
security professionals was conducted. The survey examined whether anti-phishing
training and education could prevent attacks against organisations. The results, as shown
in Fig.1-1, found that 78% of the respondents believed phishing “is one of the most
significant threats we face today.1” (Griffin, 2017).

1

This study was conducted in 2017 using Survey Monkey. The population was sourced through the
author’s employer. It was sent to the cyber security and risk advisory department.

1

How do you categorise phishing as a serious
business threat to your organisation?
0 0

It is one of the most
significant threats we
face today

21.74

It is of some concern
but not a top cyber
security priority
It is not perceived as a
serious business threat
78.26
We have not
experienced spear
phishing attacks

Figure 1-1: Responses to the current threat of phishing

1.2 Research Problem
This study will highlight the similarities between certain demographics and their
vulnerability to three phishing categories. Researchers have studied why people fall for
phishing attacks however; limited research has been done to study demographic factors
in vulnerability to phishing. By determining which groups are most vulnerable to
phishing, we can potentially outline the best course of action to prevent and protect
against it. (Sheng, Holbrook, Kumaraguru, Cranor, & Downs, 2010).
The objective of this research project is to identify differences that exist among several
demographics to determine which population group is more vulnerable to being
exploited by a particular phishing category. There are many different types of phishing
such as email, search engine, session hijacking, DNS-based and deceptive phishing.
Although email is widely used, “phishing has spread beyond email to include VoIP,
SMS, instant messaging, social networking sites, and even massively multiplayer
games” (Hong, 2012).
Three categories of phishing have been selected for this research project due to their
recurring nature and potential to cause harm (Hong, 2012; Huang, Zhong, & Tan, 2009).
These include:
1. Email – Phishes sent via email
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2. Smishing – SMS phishing where an attacker uses text messages to exploit
victims.
3. Content Spoofing – Altering some of the content of a reliable page to trick
users.
Five demographic groups were chosen in order to compare and contrast their
vulnerability to the three phishing categories. The demographics chosen for this study
are:
1. Gender
2. Age
3. Education
4. Income
5. Occupation/Student
Research Questions
To determine whether demographics have an influence on a person’s vulnerability to
phishing, the research seeks to answer:
RQ1: Are members of demographic groups more vulnerable to being exploited by a
particular category of phishing attack?
With the research question defined, several hypotheses were outlined which are to be
investigated:
Hypothesis 1:
H0: When given a quiz, there is no difference in the mean test scores between males
and females as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack.
H1: When given a quiz, there is a difference in the mean test scores between males
and females as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack.
Hypothesis 2:
H0: When given a quiz, there is no difference in the mean test scores between age
groups as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack.
H1: When given a quiz, there is a difference in the mean test scores between age
groups as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack.
3

Hypothesis 3:
H0: When given a quiz, there is no difference in the mean test scores between
education levels as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack
H3: When given a quiz, there is a difference in the mean test scores between
education levels as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack
Hypothesis 4:
H0: When given a quiz, there is no difference in the mean test scores between
income levels as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack
H4: When given a quiz, there is a difference in the mean test scores between income
levels as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack
Hypothesis 5:
H0: When given a quiz, there is no difference in the mean test scores between
occupations or students as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack.
H5: When given a quiz, there is a difference in the mean test scores between
occupations or students as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack.

1.3 Research Objectives
Most of the past work in the area of phishing has focused on why people fall for an
attack, how to deal with detection, trends, and the economic impact. Little research has
been carried out regarding what type of users are vulnerable to being phished
(Kumaraguru et al., 2009a; Sheng et al., 2010). After performing a thorough review of
the relevant literature, it appears no study has been undertaken to determine what types
of phishing are the most successful at exploiting these users.
This research study is a quantitative evaluation of vulnerability among different types of
phishing. Whether gender, age, education, income or occupation influences the user’s
vulnerability to phishing is determined by this study. The objective of the research is to
administer a scored survey to capture demographic information of a large and diverse
population group. The survey will include questions relating to three phishing categories
that users undertake. The results will be analysed to determine if the different users
defined by their demographics are more vulnerable than others are to being phished by
one or more of the categories.
4

1.4 Research Methodologies
The research methodologies used in this study included primary research collecting
demographic information and participants answers from a scored survey on the three
defined categories of phishing attacks. A survey format was the chosen research method
for this study, utilised to acquire responses from the population group. The survey was
administered online so the target population could be reached more easily and the results
could be obtained quicker. The format of the survey presented each question with
mandatory status, providing respondents with pre-defined answers. This ensured that
each participant completed the survey fully, and prevented the risk of partial responses
which would render the answers unusable.
The participants were presented with five questions relating to each category of
phishing. Each question asked the respondent if it is legitimate or not i.e. would they use
and interact with the content as if they normally would. Quantitative research was carried
out by statistically analysing if a difference exists between the mean scores of each
category among the demographic groups. The quantitative methodology was selected
because of the types of data analysis that are needed in order to accurately draw
conclusions from the data gathered. Empirical analysis of the data was carried out to
either accept or reject the defined hypotheses. An inductive approach was used to
develop theories on the vulnerability of demographic groups per phishing category.

1.5 Scope and Limitations
The literary research for this study covers many topics, from phishing to how and why
people fall victim to phishing attacks and historically what demographics are most
vulnerable. The assessment of vulnerability to a particular type of phishing was limited
to three that were viewed as the most prevalent and dangerous. There are wide ranges of
different phishing attacks, and it would be unachievable to assess each type given the
scope of this research.
The survey will attempt to assess demographic vulnerability in respect to the three types
of phishing identified. It would be preferable to assess a large number of demographics
but given the wide range of different demographics that exist, and the scope of this
research project, five were selected. The limitations of this study include such areas as
non-response bias. Those who choose not to respond to the survey could have different
views and phishing awareness than those who do. Given the number of categories per
5

demographic group, which will divide the amount of responses across the group, a large
sample size is needed if the results are to obtain a high statistical power. If low response
numbers are recorded for some of the categories within a demographic group, it will be
hard to infer robust results. One aim of this research was to project the results onto a
larger population. With generalisability in mind, it may be hard to do this without a
proper random sample obtained.

1.6 Document Outline


Chapter 2: This consists of the literature review, which will outline what
phishing is, how attacks are performed and the different types of phishing.
Demographic vulnerability to phishing and how to counteract it are also
presented.



Chapter 3: This chapter outlines the design and methodology of the study. It
focuses on why a survey was used for data collection and the statistical tools and
methods used to analyse the data.



Chapter 4: This chapter illustrates the distribution of the demographic groups
as well as the significant descriptive statistics that were recorded. Finally, the
statistical analysis is carried out that will conclude whether or not the null
hypotheses are rejected.



Chapter 5: This discusses the results obtained from Chapter 4 in light of what is
already known. The results are used to confirm or refute previous work and
highlight what new findings have emerged.



Chapter 6: This gives a short account of the results obtained and the research
problem that was being addressed. Limitations of the study are highlighted and
any future work that might be undertaken is recommended.
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2

Literature Review and Related Work

2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, a number of topics are discussed that will present an overview of phishing
and some of the important points relating to how attacks are carried out and demographic
vulnerability. Firstly, a description of the origins of phishing and why people fall for
phishing attacks are introduced. The anatomy of how phishing attacks are usually
performed and the different types of phishing that exist are discussed. Furthermore,
analysis of the literature that discusses demographic vulnerability to phishing and
approaches on how to deal with and counteract phishing are presented.
This chapter’s purpose is to set out and identify the concepts that relate to the research
question and to highlight any gaps in the literature that may exist between phishing and
demographic vulnerability.

2.2 What is Phishing?
Phishing is a type of social engineering attack in which cybercriminals use fake or
spoofed emails and deceitful web sites in order to trick people into giving out sensitive
information. Social engineering is “any act that influences someone to take an action
that may or may not be in his or her best interest” (Hadnagy, 2014, p. 27). The victims
of these attacks perceive the emails and websites as legitimate but they are the work of
criminals looking to perform fraud and identity theft (Sheng & Magnien, 2007).
Although the exact origins of phishing may be open to debate, Symantec report that the
first instances of phishing attacks occurred in the mid 1990’s targeting America Online
(AOL) (Symantec, 2007). They go on to say “The attackers typically used either instant
messages or email to trick users into divulging their AOL passwords. Victims would
provide the attackers with this information, which the attackers would, in-turn, leverage
to assume ownership of the victim’s AOL account”.
Parno, Kuo, & Perrig (2006), concluded that phishing was a growing problem that
threatens businesses and consumers due to its exploitative nature. It is widely seen as
the most common form of fraud to steal personal information (Eisenstein, 2007; Keith
B. Anderson, Erik Durbin & Salinger, 2008). The damage caused is not just financial as
trust from customers is also affected. Due to the phish usually appearing as if it is from
a reputable source, the reputation of the business might also be damaged in the process.
Consumers may associate the negative effects of the fraud with the company and might
7

stop using their services completely. According to a Gartner survey in 2007, “3.6 million
U.S. adults lost a total of 3.2 billion dollars directly due to phishing” (Huang et al., 2009).
Phishing attacks usually begin by targeting the public and aiming to steal personal
information but it has also evolved to target more high profile victims. This is known as
whaling, a process where senior executives within a business are targeted in the hopes
they reveal sensitive company information or corporate secrets.

2.3 Why We Fall for Phishing Attacks
Many users fall victim to phishing attacks because they lack the knowledge to properly
identify them (Sheng et al., 2010). Cybercriminals prey on people’s vulnerabilities and
take advantage of this by attempting to phish the victim using fear tactics, strict deadlines
or stressful situations. Research shows that there are several reasons why people are
vulnerable to phishing attacks (Sheng et al., 2010). The authors state “people tend to
judge a website’s legitimacy by its look and feel which attackers can easily replicate”.
There are a number of tools at the disposal of cybercriminals to clone a reputable web
site such as LinkedIn or Facebook. The Social Engineer Toolkit and httrack using Kali
Linux can clone webpages and potentially trick the user into entering personal
information (Anoop, 2016). Some of the earliest studies investigating why people fall
for phishing attacks were undertaken by (Dhamija, Tygar, & Hearst, 2006; Downs,
Holbrook, & Cranor, 2006; Downs et al., 2007; Wu, Miller, & Garfinkel, 2006).


Dhamija et al., (2006), states, “22 participants were shown 20 web sites and
asked to determine which ones were fraudulent”. They found that 90% of the
participants were fooled by the best phishing sites, with few noticing the security
indicators presented to them.



Wu, Miller, & Garfinkel (2006) commented, “Users fail to continuously check
the browser’s security indicators, since maintaining security is not the user’s
primary goal”. The authors attribute this to the users relying on the web content
to decide if the site is authentic or not. This supports the point from Sheng et al.,
(2010), clearly showing that users do not spend much time judging whether the
site is real or spoofed outside of the content displayed to them.
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Third, the perceived consequences are not a good predictor of identifying or
avoiding a phishing attack. Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor (2007) state, “The
ratings of consequences suggest that fear of credit card theft is not a great
motivator for protecting one’s information”. The authors go on to note,
“protections against phishing might not gain much traction from warnings about
how



easy

it

would

be

for

a

phisher

to

steal

one’s

card.”

Lastly, although users may be aware of phishing, it does not reduce their
vulnerability to identifying an attack as they employ their own methods to
decipher whether the content is real or spoofed (Downs et al., 2006). Downs et
al., (2006), go on to say “Participants used various strategies to make decisions
about the trustworthiness of email, mostly centred around interpreting the text of
the email rather than any more reliable cues in headers or URLs associated with
links”.

2.4 Anatomy of an Attack
A phishing attack may seem like an easy, juvenile fraud but there are layers to it that
require expertise and knowledge to exploit people’s natural tendencies. According to
Hong (2012), there are three major phases to a phishing attack.
1. The first is for potential victims to receive a phish. Most phishing scams are sent
via email as they can be quickly produced and mass distributed. As previously
mentioned, the phish usually uses social techniques, rather than technical tricks
to fool end users. The author remarks, “Conveying urgency is a well-known
method used by criminals to misdirect people’s attention. An example is
pretending to be a system administrator warning people about a new attack,
urging them to install the attached patch.”

2. The second is the victim performing the suggested action in the message. Once
the victim has incorrectly flagged the phishing attempt as real, they are usually
asked to do something such as install software or follow a hyperlink. Most
phishing attacks try to convince people to go to a spoofed website where personal
and sensitive information will be collected. “The user connects to a spoof website
by clicking on a link in the email. Their web browser may access the website
directly or be redirected from an initial site to the actual phishing pages” (Moore
9

& Clayton, 2007). The scammers will usually try to host a fake site using a
compromised machine or register a new domain. When registering a new
domain, the scammers look for names similar to the site they want to
impersonate, and employ homograph attacks2. These are done to “exploit the
visual similarity of characters, for example, bankofthevvest.com uses two v’s to
look like a w” (Hong, 2012).

3. Finally, the third is the criminal monetising stolen information. Once the user
has been presented with an accurate clone of the target site, they are usually
requested to fill in their personal information. “The compromised details are
usually emailed to a webmail address, but are sometimes stored in plain text files
at the spoof website, awaiting direct collection by the fraudster” (Moore &
Clayton, 2007). Once the details are received, they are usually then sold on to
cashiers who will target areas such as bank accounts. Moore and Clayton (2007),
go on to say, “The mean lifetime of a normal phishing site is 61.69 hours”,
illustrating how quickly this type of fraud can happen and disappear without a
trace.

2.5 Types of Phishing Attacks
This study will look to demonstration the potential vulnerabilities certain demographics
have in relation to three categories of phishing attack. Email is the most common form
of phishing, capable of many attack vectors such as deceptive phishing, malware attacks
and DNS based attacks (Jones, Towse, & Race, 2015).
Email
Due to the reliance on email by most of the people in the world for either business or
personal use, the number of potential targets for cybercriminals is massive. Sending an
e-mail and asking for a user’s bank account login details is a simple idea and it costs
almost nothing. “Each day more and more e-mails are sent with the aim of making the
web users believe that the same is legitimate and from the trusted institutions” (Purkait,
2012). Email phishing can take place in many ways, each with their own level of
creativity and deception. One of the most common methods employed to trick a user is
to convey a sense of urgency, such as notifying the victim they have failed to login
2

A homograph is a letter or string that is visually confusable with a different letter or string https://www.gribble.org/papers/usenix06_homograph.pdf
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multiple times and must verify their account details or risk severe consequences (Hong,
2012).
As aforementioned in Chapter 1.1, research was conducted using a survey prior to this
study with twenty-three cyber security professionals, examining whether anti-phishing
training and education could prevent attacks against organisations. Of the twenty-three
participants, twelve stated that they have received a phishing email in the last six months
intending to steal their personal information as illustrated in the figure below. A further
ten respondents remarked that they have received both an email and phone call from an
unreliable source trying to steal their personal information (Griffin, 2017).
Have you received an email or phone call in the last 6 months
that you suspect was a fraudulent way to steal your data?

12
10
8
6

12
10

4
2
1

0

0
Yes, Email

Yes, Phonecall

Yes, Both

No

Figure 2-1: Number of fraudulent attempts to steal data

Spear Phishing
Spear phishing is a more sophisticated form of email phishing, which is utilised to target
individuals, small groups or organisations. Zhao, An, & Kiekintveld (2016), state that it
“uses personal information and social engineering to craft very believable messages with
the goal of inducing the recipient to open an attachment, or visit an unsafe website by
clicking a link.” Although similar to regular email phishing, spear phishing is a much
more costly process than sending spam email messages in the hopes of an everyday user
interacting with it. For example, if a cybercriminal is looking for specific data that an
organisation holds, they must first find out who has access to the data and target those
people specifically (Wardman, 2016).
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Content Spoofing
Content spoofing refers to an attack when a criminal inserts malicious content into a
legitimate site in order to trick the user into thinking it is real. This malicious content
can “redirect to other sites, install malware on a user’s computer, or insert a frame of
content that will redirect data to a phishing server” (Jakobsson, Myers, 2006, p36). These
types of attacks are made possible by an injection vulnerability in the web application
that fails to correctly handle user-supplied data. It is possible for cybercriminals to lure
a victim into viewing spoofed content by inserting malicious links into emails, web
pages or forums. Such spoofing attempts can be hindered if the users are trained and
know what to look for within the content of the page. Kong (2011), states, “However, a
hacker may modify the information and the links in an established website by altering
the content on the server of a legitimate organisation. This mode of content spoofing is
more difficult to detect because the casual Internet user cannot tell whether the page is
legitimate or not.”
Smishing
A mobile device is defined as a small computing device, usually with a small output
screen, which may have touch input or miniaturised keyboard (W. C. Hu, Y. Zuo, 2009).
In 2016, it was estimated that over 62% of the world’s population owned a mobile phone,
with that number expecting to exceed five billion by 20193. Today, the use of mobile
phones is almost a necessity in order to browse the internet or use the devices
applications; be it for business or personal use (Parasuraman, 2017). Due to phishing
being on a dramatic rise, it comes as no surprise that phishing via landline and mobile
phones is now a big concern. Instead of a phishing attack happening through email or a
spoofed webpage, smishing relies on short messaging services (SMS) or text messages
(Yeboah-Boateng & Amanor 2014). Yeboah-Boateng & Amanor (2014), expresses
there are two main processes for smishing scams. The first “involves receiving a text
message which is purported to have originated from a known and trusted source, such
as your bankers or your system administrator”. The second “involves you receiving a
vital text message about your identity been stolen or account number been frozen”. As

3

Statistics taken from https://www.statista.com/statistics/274774/forecast-of-mobile-phone-users-

worldwide/
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previously mentioned in chapter 2.3, the same human instincts of fear, stress and severe
consequences are preyed upon to have the user fall for this fraud. The SMS or text
message then directs you to a website via hyperlink or a phone number so you can verify
your details. Upon receiving this sensitive information, the cybercriminals use it to
withdraw money from the victim’s bank account or attempt to set up a new credit card
with their name. Smishing also has the added danger of attachments being sent with the
original message, which the victim thinks is from a reputable source. This can lead to
“the attachment downloading a virus or malware unto the victim’s device which in turn
installs a root kit or backdoor for the scammers to have access to everything on the
phone” (Yeboah-Boateng & Amanor, 2014).
Vishing
Vishing is another form of phishing involving phone calls, where the attacker attempts
to lure the victim into providing personal information and exploit this information for
personal gain. The term is derived from two different words, voice and phishing.
Attackers tend to favour Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) rather than traditional
telephone phone calls, as the whole process can be brought up and down in a short time.
Noblis (2007, p. 42), gives a description of a typical vishing attack, where “an attacker
calls a large number of telephone numbers, spoofing their Caller ID credentials to appear
to be originating from a credit card company or some other trusted provider. They direct
consumers to a telephone number that they control to collect personal information to be
used for fraud, often using a voice response system.”

2.6 Demographics
“Previous work suggests that users’ demographics are useful indicators in identifying
the most vulnerable users to phishing attacks” (Mohebzada, Zarka, Bhojani, & Darwish,
2012). There have been some studies completed to analyse how vulnerable certain
demographics are to phishing attacks (Gavett et al., 2017a; Kumaraguru et al., 2009b;
Sheng et al., 2010). The studies that have been carried out to analyse demographic
vulnerability to phishing have revolved around the user’s age or gender. There appears
to be gaps in the knowledge when the research involves other demographics such as
income, education and occupation. This became evident during the literature collection
process due to the lack of peer-reviewed research available.
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Age and Gender
Research has been carried out to examine why phishing occurs but only a few studies
look at the demographic factors relating to phishing vulnerability. Kumaraguru et
al.,(2009) undertook a real world phishing study to investigate demographic factors to
phishing susceptibility. The project which comprised of 515 participants concluded that
there was no significant difference among gender in the tendency to fall for phishing
emails. The 18-25 age group was consistently seen as the most vulnerable age group to
phishing attacks. Similarly, Sheng et al., undertook a study in 2010 to examine the
relationship between demographics and phishing susceptibility. The authors performed
a roleplay phishing exercise to analyse these factors and view the effectiveness of antiphishing educational material. They found that “women are more susceptible than men
to phishing” and supporting Kumaraguru et al., “participants between the ages of 18 and
25 are more susceptible to phishing than other age groups” (Sheng et al., 2010). These
findings suggest that younger individuals are more vulnerable to a phishing attack. This
could be due to a number of reasons such as a lack of education in the subject matter or
being too trust worthy of web content presented to them. In a study by Gavett et al.,
(2017), the authors sought to determine whether older adults are more vulnerable to
phishing attacks. They commented that “compared to younger adults, older adults were
more likely to have knowledge of phishing and more likely to have been victimised by
phishing in the past”. This is an interesting point as it could explain why younger
individuals are more vulnerable to phishing. Gavett et al., (2017), further backs up this
claim by remarking that in relation to phishing attacks, “being an older adult was
associated with 3.69 time’s greater odds of being suspicious relative to younger adults”.
Education
In a study by Dhamija et al., (2006), 22 participants were shown 20 web sites and asked
to determine which ones were fraudulent. They concluded that, “Good phishing websites
fooled 90% of participants”. The authors found that there was “no significant correlation
between education level and scores.” They also stated, “Among our participants, we did
not observe a relationship between scores and sex, age, educational level or experience.
A larger study is needed to establish or rule out the existence of such effects in the
general population.”
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Income
Little research appears to have been undertaken to analyse whether income is a factor in
vulnerability to phishing. It makes sense that cybercriminals would target victims with
more assets in order to maximise their rewards but the literature suggest differently.
Leukfeldt (2014) investigates phishing victims, and the increased or decreased risk of
victimisation. Leukfeldt studies whether victims have significantly higher income and
financial assets than non-victims and the results show that financial characteristics do
not seem to play a role. He goes on to say, “An unemployed person on a shoestring
budget or a director of a multinational company: everyone has an equal chance of
becoming a victim. There seems to be no evidence for so-called spear-phishing attacks
on specific targets with lots of money.”
Occupation/Student
In contrast to income and education, there has been some research performed to look at
vulnerability to phishing regarding of whether the user is a student or employed.
Unfortunately, most of this research is not peer reviewed and reported on by
organisational reports. In a study by Mohebzada et al., (2012), the authors performed
two real life large scale phishing attacks on 10,917 members of a university including
students and faculty. The experiments involved “sending spoofed emails which seemed
to come from legitimate sources” which were intended to trick the subjects into revealing
their confidential information. The author’s found that 9% of the enrolled students and
alumni fell for the phishing attack. Comparing the results between students and faculty,
it emerged that “students were more prone to phishing attacks…which indicates that
experience could be a factor in victimising an individual during a social engineering
attack.” Similarly, in a study by Metzger, Flanagin, & Zwarun (2003), the authors
recorded both students and non-students ability to evaluate potentially spoofed online
content. The results showed that “students generally found all sources of information to
be more credible than the non-students did, rating all channels except the Internet as
significantly more credible as did the non-students.” These findings illustrate that
students are more trustworthy of online content presented to them and could potentially
be more vulnerable to a phishing attack.
McAfee reported in their August, 2014 threat analysis that “employees working at
accounting, finance and HR performed the worst at recognising phishing attempts, while
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these are departments that arguably hold some of the most sensitive data of the
organisation” (McAfee, 2014).

2.7 Dealing with Phishing
Approaches to Examining the Problem
Due to the rapid growth of phishing and its potential impact, several methods are usually
undertaken to examine user vulnerability. These include either a questionnaire or survey
to collect user data and some sort of visual exam to test the participant’s knowledge and
reactions (Anti-Phishing Working Group, 2017; Butler, 2007; Downs et al., 2006;
Erkkilä, 2011; Jansson & Von Solms, 2013; Kumaraguru et al., 2009b; Sheng et al.,
2010). Such approaches are typically undertaken due to their proficiency for collecting
and analysing user data as the tests can be done in a safe ‘lab’ environment. Other real
world examples are employed such as sending out phishing emails to an entire student
campus or organisation and measuring the success rate (Rocha Flores, Holm, Nohlberg,
& Ekstedt, 2015). These are often the best methods to capture real phishing statistics but
include their own ethical and privacy issues.
Methods to Counteract Phishing
The most successful techniques to counteract phishing attacks rely on interactive demos,
online training materials, testing and situated learning in order to outline where these
attacks occur and how to identify them (Jensen, Dinger, Wright, & Thatcher, 2017;
Lastdrager, Gallardo, Junger, & Hartel, 2017; Mayhorn & Nyeste, 2012). Jensen,
Dinger, Wright, & Thatcher (2017), state that “to prevent phishing attacks, organisations
often rely on three techniques”:
1. “Automated removal or quarantine of phishing messages and corresponding
websites”.
2. “Automated warning mechanisms that notify individuals when they encounter a
suspicious message or website”.
3. “Behavioural training during which individuals are taught to identify and report
attacks”.
Training materials are usually published by security firms, non-profit organisations and
government entities in an effort to inform the public and organisations of the potential
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dangers. Griffin (2017) states that “in a paper by Sheng & Magnien (2007), the authors
design and evaluate the implementation of an anti-phishing online game, Anti-Phishing
Phil.” Learning science principles were employed to design and iteratively refine the
game, which was evaluated through a user study. They found that “the participants who
played the game were better able to identify fraudulent web sites compared to the
participants in other conditions.” Training and education appear to be among the best
techniques in order to mitigate against phishing attacks. Similarly to Sheng & Magnien
(2007), another study was undertaken by Kumaraguru et al., (2009b), to test the longterm retention of anti-phishing training by users. Five hundred and fifteen participants
were split evenly among three groups, which were control, single training and multiple
training. The participants were all sent a series of legitimate and illegitimate spear
phishing emails over the course of one month and the two training groups received a
series of anti-phishing training material in this time. The results of the study show that:
1. “Users trained with PhishGuru retain knowledge even after 28 days.”
2. “Adding a second training message to reinforce the original training decreases
the likelihood of people giving information to phishing websites.”

2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, a variety of literature relating to phishing was examined. Firstly, an
outline of phishing, its origins and how it has become a serious threat to businesses and
consumers was considered. A discussion on why users fall for phishing attacks was
introduced and four key points were highlighted as the primary contributing factors. The
anatomy of phishing attacks were identified, discussing the three main phases that
usually occur when an attack is carried out. Furthermore, several of the most common
types of phishing were explored, detailing how they are used to exploit vulnerable users
and the constant adaptation that they utilise in order to remain dangerous and undetected.
Additionally, demographic vulnerability to phishing was reviewed from what is already
known. Age, gender, income, education and occupation were selected as the five
demographics to be analysed and the apparent gaps that exist in the literature relating to
them were identified. Finally, the approaches to dealing with phishing and the most
effective methods to counteract phishing attacks were examined.
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3

Design and Methodology

3.1 Introduction
This chapter will outline the design and methodology used in order to carry out the study.
It begins by giving a brief overview of the design and why new information was needed
in order to complete the study. A breakdown of each demographic is described and the
reasons for choosing the categories that make up the demographic groups. The reasons
for choosing a survey as an adequate data collection mechanism are explained and why
a convenience sample was used rather than a random sample. A more detailed
explanation of the design is outlined; breaking down the survey into its two sections and
mentions how the respondent population was targeted. Finally, the statistical tools and
methods used to analyse the data are presented and any necessary expectations of the
data are explained.

3.2 Design Overview
As aforementioned in Chapter 1, little research has been completed to study
demographic factors relating to the vulnerability of phishing. A thorough search of the
relevant literature was conducted and it appears that none have been undertaken linking
these demographic factors with vulnerability to specific categories of phishing. Due to
this, new information needed to be gathered to allow an up to date study to be completed.
Although there are many different types of phishing, three have been selected due to
their recurring nature and potential to cause harm (Hong, 2012; Huang et al., 2009). The
three types of phishing that will be analysed in this study are:
1. Email
2. SMiShing
3. Content Spoofing
The first stage of this study was to prepare a survey that investigates how vulnerable
users are to the three defined categories of phishing attacks. The first section of the
survey collected demographic information so the participants can be gathered into their
respective demographic groups. The second section contained five questions relating to
each of the three phishing categories described above.
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Demographic Breakdown
In order to accurately track demographic information of the respondents, each
demographic set had several categories. For gender, the respondents could be male or
female and to study age, the demographic set was divided into the following groups:
1. 18-25
2. 26-35
3. 36-45
4. 46-55
5. 56 +
Educational categories were chosen using the European Qualifications Framework
(EQF) due to this study not being exclusively limited to Ireland. It is used as “an
overarching qualifications framework, which would serve as a translation device to
make qualifications more readable and understandable across different countries and
systems in Europe” (EFQ, 2009). The EFQ utilises eight levels, which are categorised
by a set of descriptors to indicate the relevant learning qualifications. The first four levels
were discarded, as the study is not concerned with the participant’s earlier achievements
such as the Junior or Leaving Certificate. The lowest education category a respondent
could select was Level 5, which is the equivalent of an associate degree. This degree is
awarded by colleges upon completion of a course that usually lasts two years. Level 6
consists of a Bachelor’s degree or a higher diploma while level 7 is a Master’s degree or
postgraduate diploma. Level 8 refers to a Doctorate degree or higher doctorate and is the
highest level of education that can be chosen by participants. Finally, an option for
“None of the above” was added if the participant did not have any of the outlined
degrees. The options participants could select from are highlighted below:
1. Level 5 (Advanced/Higher Certificate)
2. Level 6 (Bachelor’s Degree/Higher Diploma)
3. Level 7 (Master's Degree/Postgraduate Diploma)
4. Level 8 (Doctorate Degree/Higher Doctorate)
5. None of the above
Income was also tracked between several brackets to reflect the respondent’s current
yearly earnings. This information coupled with the other responses could be too intrusive
for some participants, so the option to not disclose their income was added.
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1. € 0 - 20,000
2. € 20,000 - 30,000
3. € 30,000 - 40,000
4. € 40,000 - 50,000
5. € 50,000 - 60,000
6. € 60,000 +
7. I don't want to disclose
Finally, the respondents would then answer whether they were a student or working, and
if so, what industry they work in. Due to the large number of industries that people can
work in, several of the most all-encompassing were chosen in order to get accurate
results, which were:
1. Agriculture
2. Business/Finance
3. Education
4. Healthcare
5. Information Technology
6. Manufacturing
7. Media
8. Student

3.3 Survey Design and Responses
Why a Survey was used
The term ‘survey’ refers to the selection of a relatively large sample of people from a
pre-determined population. This is usually followed by a collection of data from the
individuals with which the researcher makes an inference about the wider population
known as the population of interest (Kelley, Clark, Brown, & Sitzia, 2003). This study
was undertaken with the hopes that the results could be projected onto a larger
population set, with generalisability in mind. Some of the advantages of using a survey
given the nature of this study are noted by (Kelley et al., 2003).
1. “The research produces data based on real world observations (empirical data)”.
This is true as the phishing samples used in the survey come from real world
phishing attacks. This allowed the participants to see first-hand how deceptive
and legitimate phishing attacks have become.
20

2. “Surveys can produce a large amount of data in a short time for a fairly low cost”.
Due to the project life cycle of this study only lasting several months, it was
concluded that a survey was an ideal research strategy in order to capture
representative results quickly.
3. “The breadth of coverage of many people or events means that it is more likely
than some other approaches to obtain data based on a representative sample, and
can therefore be generalisable to a population”. This is yet another reason why a
survey was selected because it is hoped that this research will accurately project
the results to a larger population set.
Piloting of the survey was necessary so the respondents can easily understand the
concept, the questions presented and the instructions displayed. Piloting is a process of
testing the research strategy/tool on a sample of members from the target population and
is helpful in highlighting whether sufficient responses are available to the participants.
It is important that when conducting a pilot, that the same procedure be used as if it was
the real survey to outline any potential problems with responses.
The study set out to be able to project the results onto a wider population utilising a large
random sample to gather responses. Brant, Haas-Haseman, Wei, Wickham, & Ponto
(2015), remark that using this method will “increases the likelihood that the responses
from the sample will accurately reflect the entire population.” The authors go on to say,
“in order to accurately draw conclusions about the population, the sample must include
individuals with characteristics similar to the population.” For this study, it was
improbable to accurately obtain a random sample given the time constraints and cost it
could incur. For example, gathering population information from third party sources
such as a company could incur a cost. It may also take a significant amount of time to
retrieve this information with no guarantee of completion. Due to this, a convenience
sample was used which is a type of nonprobability sample that obtains responses in any
way possible. Etikan (2016), states it is “where members of the target population that
meet certain practical criteria, such as easy accessibility, geographical proximity,
availability at a given time, or the willingness to participate are included for the purpose
of the study.” It may be difficult to make valid inferences about the larger population
group because this is probably not a true random sample. In order to mitigate against
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this, a snowball sample was also employed which asks the respondents to suggest
another person or group of people willing to participate in the study. With the amount
of demographic information being collected from the respondents and the large number
of categories per demographic set, it is hoped that it will be feasible to accurately project
the results onto a larger population.
Another way to mitigate against the potential lack of generalisability is to increase the
sample size. There is no definitive answer as to how many responses are necessary for
a survey and this study is an analysis of quantitative data. Due to this, responses needed
to be high in order to give a better estimate of the population.
Design
The online survey was created using Google Forms for several reasons such as the ability
to easily distribute it among multiple social media platforms and its built-in statistics
and analytics. In order to accurately test the participants against the types of phishing
attacks that are present today, several data sources were utilised to get the samples used
in the survey. Personal email accounts, mobile phones and online phishing databases
such as Phishtank4 were used to collect the samples. Many different samples were
identified as potential options to be used in the survey. The samples, which were chosen
to be included in the survey, were selected due to their ability to look like a genuine web
page or request. This was done to give a lasting impression of how dangerous and
concealed phishing can be. The survey was split into two sections, which are as follows:
Section 1
Section 1 collected demographic information from five key areas, which were:
1. Gender
2. Age
3. Education
4. Income
5. Occupation/Student
As described above in chapter 2, it is clear that some demographic information has been
analysed in previous studies to show how vulnerable users are to phishing. From the
research, age and gender are the main demographic factors which have been previously
4

https://www.phishtank.com/developer_info.php
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studied. In order to obtain new data on what other demographics are most vulnerable,
five were selected to extend the research.
Section 2
Section 2 then presented the participants with questions. The questions were divided
between the three phishing categories as follow:


Question 1 – 5: Email Phishing



Question 6 – 10: Smishing



Question 11 – 15: Content Spoofing

The questions were in the form of screenshots using real world phishing examples taken
from the sources listed above. These images were harmless depictions of real phishing
examples and legitimate sites, which was important from an ethical point of view. Each
category contained several real phishing examples and several genuine requests, which
tested how accurately the participants could identify the phishing attacks. The
participants answered whether the information presented to them was legitimate or not,
assessing if they would interact with the content like normal. A binary scoring system
of zero and one was used per question, zero indicating an incorrect answer and one
indicating a correct answer. This left the participants with three separate scores out of
five, relating to each of the three phishing categories and a total score out of fifteen.
Respondent Population
The research studied members of multiple demographic groups who participated in the
survey. Surveying multiple demographic groups with no limiting restrictions allowed
for greater participation due to the larger number of possible respondents. In order to
gather responses to the survey, it was distributed electronically to third party social and
professional groups. The survey was not distributed via internal corporate channels; this
removed the necessity for permission of distribution. Social media sites such as
Facebook, LinkedIn and WhatsApp, as well as third party participants who were
reachable via email were also utilised. As previously stated, this type of sampling is
known as convenience sampling in order to generate responses which can have a
negative effect on the generalisability of the results (Etikan, 2016). To mitigate against
this, the participants within the convenience sample were asked to share the survey link
to their own friends, family and professional colleagues where possible. This is a term
known as snowballing and it was employed to increase the number of respondents who
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completed the survey and distribute it to a wider population (Dragan & Isaic-Maniu,
2013). This also allowed for greater generalisability of the results across a larger
population set. Before the survey was distributed to the population, piloting was
performed on five participants in order to confirm that the survey was understandable.
All participants were informed of the format of the survey once they opened it, which
clearly listed the instructions and what information would be collected. The survey did
not obtain any identifiable information such as name or email address and each question
was mandatory, to reduce the number of incorrect and thus unusable responses. Due to
the data being divided among the various demographic groups, this could potentially
harm the statistical legitimacy of the results. For example, if only four respondents are
male and 50 are female, no statistical analysis can be concluded due to the imbalance of
sample sizes (Button et al., 2013a). With this in mind, the target sample size was between
eighty and one hundred participants, which should allow enough responses in order to
accurately draw conclusions. The timeframe for the data collection phase was three
weeks, to allow enough time to gather an adequate number of responses.
Preamble
When participants open the survey, they are first presented with a preamble as seen
below, intended to provide context about the survey and how it should be undertaken.
This was also done to reassure them of the anonymity of their responses, which was an
important step due to the volume of demographic information collected.
This anonymous quiz contains 15 questions relating to three phishing categories
(5 per category).
Section 1 will collect some demographic information then the questions are
presented in Section 2.
Each question will contain an image and you will answer if the content is:
1. Real (you would interact with it like normal and follow the links presented)
or
2. Fake (a malicious attempt to trick the user or steal information)
Please note, once you fill in this survey, your responses will be treated in a highly
confidential manner. No identifiable information such as your name or email
address is collected and no third party will have access to this data.
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3.4 Statistical Tools and Methods Used
Variables
The survey collected data through variables known as categorical variables. Categorical
variables provide a means for the information to be sorted into categories, for example,
gender is either “Male” or “Female”. Every piece of information gathered belongs to
one category and a respondent cannot be part of more than one category per demographic
group. There are several types of categorical variables which the data belongs to. Ordinal
variables relate to when the variables have some order applied to them. An example of
this is recording income levels for a group of people in a variable called income. One
person makes less than €20,000 per year, another makes between €20,000-40,000 while
another makes €40,000 or more. These income levels fit nicely into defined categories
as the income figure increases. From within the collected dataset, age, education and
income are marked as ordinal variables.
Nominal variables are the opposite of ordinal variables because they do not contain any
defined order. For example, a variable called location, which records where a person
lives, is nominal because each of the categories do not have an order or numeric value.
Due to this, gender and occupation are counted as nominal variables within the collected
data set.
Two-sample T Test
A two-sample t test was used in order to analyse gender with the four test score
dependant variables. Skaik (2015), states, “It is used to know whether the unknown
means of two populations are different from each other based on independent samples
from each population.” This test requires that the two independent variables are
unrelated to each other and is only valid for comparing two means from a quantitative
variable. The data comes from a single population which has been divided into two
groups, male and female so it meets all the requirements in order to perform the two
sample t test. Skaik (2015) , goes on to say “If the study aims to compare three or more
means, then it is better to use an analysis of variance to avoid the loss of control over the
experiment-wise significant level.” A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used
for the remaining four demographic groups as they contain more than two categories
each.
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One-way Anova
For the statistical analysis, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was selected for
demographic groups that contained more than two categories. It is used to determine if
the mean of a dependant variable is the same in three or more mutually independent
variables. For this study, the dependant variables are:
1. Total Test Score
2. Category 1 Test Score
3. Category 2 Test Score
4. Category 3 Test Score
The independent variables refer to the different categories in each demographic group
e.g. for education, they are:
1. Level 5 (Advanced/Higher Certificate)
2. Level 6 (Bachelor’s Degree/Higher Diploma)
3. Level 7 (Master's Degree/Postgraduate Diploma)
4. Level 8 (Doctorate Degree/Higher Doctorate)
5. None of the above
The one-way Anova uses the mean value from the dependant and independent variables
to show if there is a difference between the two. This model was used to determine
whether the differences between the categories were statistically significant, with the
significance level or alpha set to 5% or (α = .05). Lavrakas (2008), states, “Alpha is a
threshold value used to judge whether a test statistic is statistically significant”. The
author goes on to say, “Alpha represents an acceptable probability of a Type I error in a
statistical test”. When a statistical significance is found between categories of a
demographic group, it is possible to determine which category or categories were
significantly different from each other by using a post hoc test. Post hoc tests are needed
“because the one-way ANOVA is an omnibus test and cannot tell you which specific
groups were significantly different from each other; it only tells you that at least two
groups were different.5” To alleviate against this, a post hoc test is run which is explained
by Kim (2017). “When comparing the population means of three mutually independent
groups A, B, and C, if the significance level is 0.05, then the significance level used for

5

https://statistics.laerd.com/stata-tutorials/one-way-anova-using-stata.php
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comparisons of groups A and B, groups A and C, and groups B and C would be 0.05/3
= 0.017”.
Before a one way Anova can be run, there are six assumptions that need to be met in
order to analyse the data. If any of the six assumptions are not met, it will not be possible
to analyse the data effectively due to the results being invalid. The six assumptions of a
one way Anova are:
Assumption 1: The dependant variable should be measured at the continuous level. The
dependant variables of this study are test scores, which are continuously measured at
either 0 to 5 or 0 to 15.
Assumption 2: “The independent variable should consist of two or more categorical,
independent groups”6. This assumption is met as each demographic group contains two
or more unrelated groups.
Assumption 3: An independence of observations should be met so there is no
relationship between the observations in each group or between groups. This assumption
is also met.
Assumption 4: There should be no significant outliers within the dataset. These are
simply values within the data that are much higher or lower than most other values,
which could skew the results. This assumption is met because STATA can detect outliers
when running the one way Anova.
Assumption 5: The “dependent variable should be approximately normally distributed
for each category of the independent variable”7. The one way Anova is quite robust to
violations of these assumptions and due to this, the data needs to be approximately
normal in order to provide valid results. The normality of the data was tested using the
Shapiro-Wilk test in STATA as well as analysing the histogram which can be seen in
Figure 3-1 below. “The word ‘normal’ here means that the data complies with a
distribution pattern that mathematically allows parametric statistical tests to be applied”
(Marshall & Jonker, 2010).

6
7

https://statistics.laerd.com/stata-tutorials/one-way-anova-using-stata.php
https://statistics.laerd.com/stata-tutorials/one-way-anova-using-stata.php
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.3
.2
0

.1

Density

5

10
Total Correct Answers

15

Figure 3-1: Histogram to identify the normality of data

Assumption 6: Finally, using the Levene’s test in STATA, there needs to be
homogeneity of variances. This was undertaken using the robvar model of Levene’s test
for each variable and it was concluded there was equality of variances between the
groups.
Statistical Software
In order to perform statistical analysis on the data collected from the survey, STATA
was selected. STATA is “a complete, integrated statistical software package that
provides everything you need for data analysis, data management, and graphics8”.

3.5 Conclusion
This chapter outlined the design and methodology used in order to carry out the study.
A detailed explanation of how the demographics are broken down was introduced such
as using the European Qualifications Framework (EQF) for education. The reasons why
a survey was selected for collecting data were addressed, stating that a convenience
sample was the best method given the time constraints. The additional methods of
piloting and using snowball sampling to increase the number of respondents was also

8

https://www.stata.com/why-use-stata/
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addressed. A detailed look at the design of the study was given, breaking the survey
down into two parts and mentioning who was targeted for the respondent population.
Finally, a detailed explanation of how the data was to be captured, coded and analysed
was introduced. A two-sample t test and one-way Anova were selected as the statistical
tools to carry out the analysis.
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4

Implementation and Results

4.1 Introduction
The object of this survey was to answer the research question, “Are members of
demographic groups more vulnerable to being exploited by a particular category of
phishing attack?” The survey collected demographic information and then presented the
respondents with 15 questions relating to three separate phishing categories. This
chapter gives a breakdown of the demographic distribution, as well as the noteworthy
descriptive statistics that were gathered. Finally, the survey results are statistically
analysed using STATA and it is concluded if there is enough evidence to reject the null
hypotheses H0.

4.2 Survey Responses
Completion Rates
In total, 189 responses were collected from the survey. This is double the original target
sample size, which will give more statistical power to the results. Each question in the
survey was mandatory which meant that no incomplete answers could be submitted. Due
to this, the number of unfinished surveys was not tracked.
Demographic Distribution
The first section of the survey collected demographic information of the respondents. A
breakdown of the participant’s gender can be seen in figure 4-1 below. As demonstrated
in the graph, there is an evenly balanced sample of respondents from each gender, which
is pivotal for the study. Gender is one of the most commonly analysed demographics
when it comes to phishing vulnerability. Due to this, an even distribution will aid the
statistical analysis and allow the results to be accurately compared against previous
studies.
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Gender
60%
50%

49%

51%

Male

Female

40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Figure 4-1: Percentile distribution of gender

A distribution of the age categories is outlined in figure 4-2. Similar to gender, age is
one of the most commonly analysed demographics in phishing vulnerability studies. The
chart shows a clear reduction in the number of responses as the age group increases. This
may be due to the sampling method that was employed which targeted social media to
acquire participants.

Age
30%

28%

28%

25%
20%
20%

17%

15%
10%

7%

5%
0%
18-25

26-35

36-45

46-55

56 +

Figure 4-2: Percentile distribution of age groups

The results for Education as shown by figure 4-3 indicate a plurality of respondents have
a Bachelor’s degree or higher diploma. Almost one third of the participants have a
Master’s degree, while 24% have either none of the defined degrees or a Level 5
Associate degree. This is valuable information to receive as analysis can be performed
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to see if having a Level 5 or lower education is detrimental to a person’s vulnerability
to phishing.

Education
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

41%
26%
13%

10%

11%

Figure 4-3: Percentile distribution of education levels

The annual gross income categories as seen in figure 4-4 show a relatively even
distribution. Due to income being one of the least analysed demographics as outlined in
Chapter 2.6.3, having a sufficient sample size among each of the categories was
important. Eleven percent of respondents chose not to disclose their gross income. In the
context of this study, this information is redundant because no clear results can be drawn
given that any of the participants may have selected this option. Due to this, the “I don’t
want to disclose” group results will be disregarded during analysis even if they are below
our significance level.
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Income
25%

23%

20%
16%

15%

14%

15%
10%

12%

11%

10%

5%
0%
€ 0 - 20,000

€ 20,000 30,000

€ 30,000 40,000

€ 40,000 50,000

€ 50,000 60,000

€ 60,000 +

I don't want
to disclose

Figure 4-4: Percentile distribution of annual gross income brackets

Finally, the results of the participants occupation is highlighted in figure 4-5. Over sixty
percent of those surveyed are employed within either the Business and Finance industry
or the Information Technology industry. Only six percent of the population are students,
which is lower than initially anticipated. As discussed in chapter 2, students are being
targeted by phishing attacks on a more regular basis so a large number of responses in
this category were desired so statistically significant conclusions to be made. This
uneven distribution may make it difficult to rely on the results of the statistical test,
which are addressed in more detail in Chapter 4.6.5.

Occupation/Student
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

39%
27%

7%

9%
4%

2%

5%

Figure 4-5: Percentile distribution of sectoral occupation/students

33

6%

4.3 Descriptive Statistics
The data presented in this chapter highlights the descriptive statistics of each
demographic group cross tabulated against total test scores, and their individual category
test scores.


Total Quiz Scores refers to the participants total score for all fifteen questions.



Category 1 Scores refers to the participants score for category 1 i.e. Questions
1-5 relating to email phishing.



Category 2 Scores refers to the participants score for category 2 i.e. Questions
6-10 relating to smishing.



Category 3 Scores refers to the participants score for category 3 i.e. Questions
11-15 relating to content injection.

Descriptive statistics are used to provide a headline analysis about the data collected.
They allow initial observations to be made regarding the data, and a chance to see
potential trends. Once the descriptive statistics have been analysed, inferential statistics
can be applied in order to draw conclusions and project the findings onto a larger group.
The mean and sample standard deviation were analysed as they make up the
fundamentals of data analysis. The mean was selected because the data is consistent
which will give a reliable answer each time. It is important not to rely on one statistic to
describe the data, as outliers and skewed distributions may affect the reliability of
findings. The sample standard deviation was also chosen because it is a commonly used
measure of variability. Again, if the data has a non-normal distribution or many outliers,
just using the standard deviation will not display all the information that is needed.
Marshall & Jonker (2010) states “the standard deviation allows for expressing variance
using the same units as those used for the observations or measurements”.
Due to the number of demographic groups and dependant variables, and with brevity in
mind, only the most significant statistics have been included in this chapter. The full list
of descriptive statistics are outlined in Appendix 2.
Gender
Gender – Total Scores
Table 4-1 shows the descriptive statistics for gender cross tabulated with their total test
scores. Males have a slightly higher mean value compared to females.
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Male

Female

Participants

92

97

Mean

11.09

10.77

Sample SD, s

1.59

1.83

Table 4-1: Descriptive statistics of the total test scores for gender

Age – Total scores
Table 4-2 shows the descriptive statistics for age cross tabulated with their total test
scores. The 56 + age group has the lowest mean score, while the 26-35 bracket appears
to have done the best, given the comparison with their standard deviation.
18 - 25

26 - 35

36 - 45

46 - 55

56 +

Participants

53

52

38

33

13

Mean

11.03

11.59

10.94

10.21

9.61

Sample SD, s

1.77

1.50

1.55

1.62

1.59

Table 4-2: Descriptive statistics of the total test scores for age

Age – Category 3 scores
Test scores for the different age groups from category three are displayed in table 4-3
below. Once again, the 56 + age group have performed the worst when analysing their
mean value but the 36 – 45 age group have a much lower standard deviation. This
indicates that the values in the statistical data set are close to the mean of the data set.
18 - 25

26 - 35

36 - 45

46 - 55

56 +

Participants

53

52

38

33

13

Mean

2.77

3.11

2.34

2.66

2.15

Sample SD, s

1.05

1.01

0.13

0.87

0.76

Table 4-3: Descriptive statistics of the category 3 test scores for age

Education
Education – Total scores
Table 4-4 below shows the descriptive statistics for education compared with their total
test scores. For the purposes of clarity, the “None of these” category within the
Education group is referred to as “No Degree” in this chapter. It can be seen that the “No
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Degree” group has the lowest mean and standard deviation value, indicating a
correlation between lower education and vulnerability to phishing.

No

Level 5

Level 6

Level 7

Level 8

Degree
Participants

20

24

77

50

18

Mean

9.75

10.20

11.20

11.14

11.44

Sample SD, s

1.58

2.18

1.64

2.32

1.90

Table 4-4: Descriptive statistics of the total test scores for education

Education – Category 1 scores
Category one test scores for the education demographic are displayed in table 4-5. It can
be seen that the “No Degree” and “Level 5” groups perform the worst on average.
No Degree

Level 5

Level 6

Level 7

Level 8

Participants

20

24

77

50

18

Mean

3.35

3.45

3.88

3.94

3.77

Sample SD, s

1.03

1.28

0.99

0.91

0.80

Table 4-5: Descriptive statistics for the category 1 test scores for education

Income
Income – Total scores
Table 4-6 below shows the descriptive statistics for income compared with their total
test scores. There is a relatively large mean test score difference among the €20,00030,000 group when compared with the others.
€

0-20k

20-30k

30-40k

40-50k

50-60k

60k +

Not
Disclosed

Participants

18

30

43

29

22

26

21

Mean

11.05

10.40

10.97

11.06

10.86

11.07

11.19

Sample SD, s

3.11

2.35

1.48

1.53

1.67

1.74

1.47

Table 4-6: Descriptive statistics of the total test scores for the income demographic
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Income – Category 1 scores
The category one test scores of the income demographic, the 60,000 + group scored best.
This group’s standard deviation value when compared to the others, also seem to indicate
a greater spread in the data as seen in Table 4-7.
€

0-20k

20-30k

30-40k

40-50k

50-60k

60k +

Not Disclosed

Participants

18

30

43

29

22

26

21

Mean

3.77

3.43

3.86

3.95

3.59

4.00

3.76

Sample SD, s

1.24

1.25

0.90

0.86

0.95

1.01

0.94

Table 4-7: Descriptive statistics of the category 1 test scores for the income demographic

Occupation/Student
Occupation/Student – Total scores
Table 4-8 shows the descriptive statistics for occupation compared with their total test
scores. The media and healthcare occupations have the best mean scores, with
agriculture scoring the worst.
Agri

Bus

Edu

Health

IT

Manu

Media

Student

Participants

4

73

14

17

51

8

10

12

Mean

9.0

10.56

10.28

11.23

11.05

10.62

11.60

11.33

Sample SD, s

2.94

1.73

1.63

4.69

1.30

0.74

1.57

1.92

Table 4-8: Descriptive statistics of the total test scores for the occupation/student demographic

Occupation/Student – Category 1 scores
Test scores for the occupation groups from category 1 are displayed in table 4-9. The
mean scores are even across all occupations apart from agriculture which performed the
worst.
Agri

Bus

Edu

Health

IT

Manu

Media

Student

Participants

4

73

14

17

51

8

10

12

Mean

2.75

3.76

3.71

3.88

3.88

3.87

3.50

3.83

Sample SD, s

2.06

0.99

0.99

1.05

0.90

0.99

0.97

1.26

Table 4-9: Descriptive statistics of the category 1 test scores for the occupation/student
demographic
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Occupation/Student – Category 3 scores
Test scores for the different occupation groups from category 3 are displayed in table 410.
Agri

Bus

Edu

Health

IT

Manu

Media

Student

Participants

4

73

14

17

51

8

10

12

Mean

2

2.46

2.07

2.76

3.17

2.50

3.40

2.83

Sample SD, s

0

0.92

0.82

0.97

0.99

0.75

0.96

1.11

Table 4-10: Descriptive statistics of the category 3 test scores for the occupation/student
demographic

Additional Analysis
Additional analysis was performed to identify the breakdown of correct answers per
question. It is clear from figure 4-6 that question 11 and 15 were the most incorrectly
answered questions by a large margin. Both phishing attempts required the user to
analyse the URL of the webpage. Although it is a subtle difference, by doing so they
would have realised it was a fake site. This confirms the points by Wu, Miller, &
Garfinkel (2006), stating that “Users fail to continuously check the browser’s security
indicators, since maintaining security is not the user’s primary goal”.

Correct Answers per Question
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

95%
88%

81%

77%

87%

93%

95%

89%
79%

69%

63%

64%

57%
37%

19%

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q6

Q7

Q8

Q9

Q10

Q11

Q12

Q13

Q14

Q15

Figure 4-6: The percentage of correct answers per question in the survey

4.4 Data Clean up
Once the data collections were complete and the survey was closed, the data was
manually analysed and cleaned. This was possible due to the relatively small response
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size and completed in order for it to be used by a statistical program. The data was
exported to a spreadsheet and the variables were coded so they could be imported into
STATA. The variables before being coded were qualitative i.e. Gender consisted of
“Male” and “Female”. In order to facilitate analysis they were given numerical values
starting with zero and incrementing through the different demographic categories. This
is done so statistical models can be run across the data, so STATA can understand the
variables, and models can be run “blind” in order to reduce bias. A breakdown of the
categories

after

being

coded

can

be

seen

in

table

4-11

below.

Value

Gender

Age

Education

Income

Occupation

0

Female

18-25

None of these

None of these

Agriculture

1

Male

26-35

Level 5

0 - 20,000

Bus/Finance

2

36-45

Level 6

20,000 - 30,000

Education

3

46-55

Level 7

30,000 - 40,000

Healthcare

4

56 +

Level 8

40,000 - 50,000

IT

5

50,000 - 60,000

Manufacturing

6

60,000 +

Media

7

Student

Table 4-11: A breakdown of the demographic categories with coding applied

4.5 Theoretical Approach
In inferential statistics, the term ‘null hypothesis’ (H0 ‘H-naught,’ ‘H-null’) denotes that
there is no relationship (difference) between the population variables in question.
Alternative hypothesis (H1 and Ha) denotes that a statement between the variables is
expected to be true. (Kim, 2017)
The findings in this chapter are displayed using the following statistical information as
seen in tables 4-12 and 4-13 below. For hypothesis 1, a two-sample t-test is used which
will analyse the 2-tailed p-value (Pr(|T| > |t|) and also the mean value (contrast) and
standard error.
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T-Test
2-tailed p-value Pr(|T| > |t|) Mean (contrast) ± standard
(p)

error

Table 4-12: Two sample t-test values, which are to be analysed

The formula for the t-test can be seen in figure 4-7.

Figure 4-7: T-test formula

For the remaining hypotheses, a one-way Anova will be run initially and the results will
be presented using the F-value and the 2-tailed p-value [Prob > F]. As mentioned in
Chapter 3.4.3, if the p value is below the significance level (α = .05), a post hoc test will
be run to get a better understanding of the groups within the demographic set. If a post
hoc test is run across the data, it is analysed using the mean (contrast) ± standard error
and the 2-tailed p-value [Prob > |t|] to identify any statistically significant differences
between the categories.
One Way Anova

Post Hoc Test

F-value (F)

Mean (contrast) ± standard
error

2-tailed p-value [Prob > F] 2-tailed p-value [Prob > |t|]
(p)

(p)

Table 4-13: Values for the one-way Anova and post hoc test which are to be analysed

4.6 Empirical Results
The empirical results are presented in this chapter using the statistical models
highlighted in Chapter 4.5. The inclusion of asterisks beside values are used to denote
different significance levels.
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** = 5%



*** = 1%

At the end of each hypothesis sub chapter, there is a breakdown of the four category test
scores. They highlight the p value, whether the results are statistically significant and
thus, if we reject the null hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1
As specified in Chapter 3.4.2, a two-sample t test was chosen in order the measure
phishing vulnerability between genders. This statistical test uses the mean value of the
four dependant variables with the independent variable, gender. The two-sample t test
was run first using the total quiz scores dependant variable, which was the participant’s
total score out of all fifteen questions. This was used to give a broader picture of the
participant’s vulnerability to phishing, before analysing the individual categories as
well. Participants were broken down by males and females (n = number of participants):


Male (n = 92)



Female (n = 97)

The first hypothesis of this study is stated below:
Hypothesis 1:
H0: When given a quiz, there is no difference in the mean test scores between males
and females as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack.
H1: When given a quiz, there is a difference in the mean test scores between males
and females as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack.
Total Test Scores:
For total test scores, there was not a statistically significant difference when comparing
males and females. The results show that females did not have a statistically significant
vulnerability to being phished (10.77 ± .1868) when compared with males (11.09 ±
.1665), p = 0.1978. This p value is outside of the defined significance level (α = .05).
With these results, the null hypothesis H0 will not be rejected.

41

Category 1 and 2 Test Scores:
Similar to total test scores, category one and two test scores did not return a statistically
significant difference when comparing males and females. The results show that females
did not have a statistically significant vulnerability to being phished via email (3.86 ±
.1011) when compared with males (3.68 ± .1081), p = 0.2220. The same result can be
seen when analysing female’s vulnerability to smishing (4.39 ± .07967) compared with
males (4.47 ± .6644), p = 0.4080. With these results, the null hypothesis H0 will not be
rejected for both categories.

Category 3 Test Scores:
There was a statistically significant difference between the category three test scores
when comparing gender vulnerability. The results show that females had a statistically
significant vulnerability to being phished via content spoofing (2.51 ± .0939) when
compared with males (2.93 ± .1090), p = 0.0039***. Due to this, the null hypothesis H0
can be rejected and the alternative hypothesis H1 can be accepted.

The p value for each test score and whether the null hypothesis is rejected can be seen
in table 4-14.
Gender – Analysis

P Value

Statistically

Reject H0

Significant
Total Test Scores

0.1978

No

No

Category 1 Scores

0.2220

No

No

Category 2 Scores

0.4080

No

No

Category 3 Scores

0.0039***

Yes

Yes (Accept H1)

Table 4-14: Analysis of results among gender regarding the four test scores

Hypothesis 2
For the remainder of the hypotheses, a one-way Anova was conducted to determine
vulnerability to phishing among the demographics. Similar to the first hypothesis, the
total quiz scores dependant variable was analysed first. This was used to give a broader
picture of the participant’s vulnerability to phishing as a whole, before analysing the
individual test score categories. Participants were classified into five age groups as
previously mentioned (n = number of participants):
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18 – 25 (n = 53)



26 – 35 (n = 52)



36 – 45 (n = 38)



46 – 55 (n = 33)



56 + (n = 13)

The second hypothesis of this study is highlighted below:
Hypothesis 2:
H0: When given a quiz, there is no difference in the mean test scores between age
groups as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack.
H1: When given a quiz, there is a difference in the mean test scores between age
groups as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack.
Total Test Scores:
There was a very statistically significant difference between the age categories (p =
0.0002). Due to the p value registering below the chosen significance value of .05, a post
hoc test was run to get a better understanding of how the specific groups differed. A
Tukey post hoc test was used combined with a Pairwise comparison of means with equal
variances. The Tukey post hoc test revealed that vulnerability to phishing was
significantly higher in the 56 + age group when compared with several of the other age
groups as highlighted below in Figure 4-15.
Age Total Statistics

P Value

Contrast ± Std. Err.

56+ vs 18-25

0.045**

-1.42 ± .509

56+ vs 26-35

0.001***

-3.88 ± .510

46-55 vs 26-35

0.002***

-1.38 ± .366

Table 4-15: Statistically significant results for the age demographic when analysing their total
test scores

Due to these results, the null hypothesis H0 can be rejected and the alternative
hypothesis H1 can be accepted.
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Category 1 Test Score:
Similar to the total test scores, There was a statistically significant difference between
the age groups (F = 3.82, p = 0.0052***). A Tukey post hoc test was run in order to
get a better understanding of the differences between the age groups. Only one group
was statistically significant from the other, with the 46-55 group being more
vulnerable when compared against the 36-45 age group as (-.677 ± .235, p = 0.036**).
Following on from the total test scores, the null hypothesis H0 will be rejected and
alternative hypothesis H1 will be accepted.
Category 2 Test Scores:
When analysing the category two test scores for age, there is a statistically significant
difference between the age groups (F = 3.80, p = 0.0054***). The post hoc test
revealed that vulnerability to smishing was significantly higher in the 46-55 age group
compared to the 18-25 age group (-.550 ± .154, p = 0.004***). There was no
statistically significant difference between any of the other groups. Given these results,
the null hypothesis H0 can be rejected and the alternative hypothesis H1 can be
accepted.

Category 3 Test Scores:
For the category three test scores, there is a statistically significant difference between
the age groups (F = 4.80, p = 0.0010***). The post hoc test revealed that vulnerability
to content spoofing was significantly higher in the 36-45 and 56 + age groups compared
to the 26-35 age group (-.773 ± .206, p = 0.002***) (-.961 ± .299, p = 0.14) respectively.
However, there was no statistically significant difference between any of the other
groups. Due to these results, the null hypothesis H0 can be rejected and the alternative
hypothesis H1 can be accepted. The p value for each test score and whether the null
hypothesis is rejected can be seen in table 4-16.
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Age – Analysis

P Value

Statistically

Reject H0

Significant
Total Test Scores

0.0002***

Yes

Yes (Accept H1)

Category 1 Scores

0.0052***

Yes

Yes (Accept H1)

Category 2 Scores

0.0054***

Yes

Yes (Accept H1)

Category 3 Scores

0.0010***

Yes

Yes (Accept H1)

Table 4-16: Analysis of results among age regarding the four test scores

Hypothesis 3
A one-way Anova was conducted to determine if the education level had an effect on a
user’s vulnerability to phishing. Participants were classified into five groups as
previously mentioned (n = number of participants). For the purposes of clarity, the
“None of these” group is referred to as “No Degree” in this chapter.


Level 5 (n = 24)



Level 6 (n = 77)



Level 7 (n = 50)



Level 8 (n = 18)



No Degree (n = 20)

The third hypothesis of this study is highlighted below:
Hypothesis 3:
H0: When given a quiz, there is no difference in the mean test scores between
education levels as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack
H1: When given a quiz, there is a difference in the mean test scores between
education levels as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack
Total Test Scores:
There was a statistically significant difference between the total test score when
compared with education levels (F = 4.81, p = 0.0010***). The Tukey post hoc test
revealed that vulnerability to phishing was significantly higher in the No Degree group
when compared with Level 6, Level 7 and Level 8 education as seen below.
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Education Total Statistics

P Value

Contrast ± Std. Err.

No Degree vs Level 6

0.005***

-1.45 ± .417

No Degree vs Level 7

0.016**

-1.39 ± .439

No Degree vs Level 8

0.017**

-1.69 ± .540

Table 4-17: Statistically significant results for the education demographic when analysing their
total test scores

This indicates that the No Degree group has a negative 1.69 lower mean score than Level
8 and this result is found to be statistically significant at the .05 level with (p = 0.017).
It can be seen that the contrast value increases with the level of education when
compared with the no degree group. This would indicate that the more educated the user
is, the less vulnerable they are to being phished. Due to these results, the null hypothesis
H0 can be rejected and the alternative hypothesis H1 can be accepted.

Category 1 Test Scores:
For category one test scores, there was not a statistically significant difference when
comparing them with education levels (F = 2.04, p = 0.0901). No post hoc test was run
due to the p value registering higher than the significance level of .05. With these results,
the null hypothesis H0 will not be rejected.

Category 2 Test Scores:
There was not a statistically significant difference when comparing the category two test
scores with education levels (F = 2.35, p = 0.0561). No post hoc test was run due to the
p value registering higher than the significance level of .05. With these results, the null
hypothesis H0 will not be rejected.

Category 3 Test Scores:
There was a statistically significant difference between the category three test scores
when compared with education levels (F = 2.43, p = 0.0490*). A post hoc test was run
but no results were within the 0.05 significance level. Due to this, the null hypothesis H0
can be rejected and the alternative hypothesis H1 can be accepted.

The p value for each test score and whether the null hypothesis is rejected can be seen
in table 4-18.
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Education Analysis

P Value

Statistically

Reject H0

Significant
Total Test Scores

0.0010***

Yes

Yes (Accept H1)

Category 1 Scores

0.0901

No

No

Category 2 Scores

0.0561

No

No

Category 3 Scores

0.0490*

Yes

Yes (Accept H1)

Table 4-18: Analysis of results among education regarding the four test scores

Hypothesis 4
A one-way Anova was conducted to determine if income level had an effect on a user’s
vulnerability to phishing. Participants were classified into seven income brackets as
previously mentioned (n = number of participants).


None of these (n = 21)



0 - 20,000 (n = 18)



20,000 - 30,000 (n = 30)



30,000 - 40,000 (n = 43)



40,000 - 50,000 (n = 29)



50,000 - 60,000 (n = 22)



60,000 + (n = 26)

The fourth hypothesis of this study is highlighted below:
Hypothesis 4:
H0: When given a quiz, there is no difference in the mean test scores between
income levels as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack
H4: When given a quiz, there is a difference in the mean test scores between income
levels as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack
Total Test Scores
There was not a statistically significant difference between the total test score when
compared with income levels (F = 0.63, p = 0.7057). Due to the p value registering above
the significance value of .05, a post hoc test was not run against the data. From the
results, the null hypothesis H0 will not be rejected.
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Category 1, 2 and 3 Test Scores:
Similar to the total test scores, there was not a statistically significant difference between
either the category one, two or three test scores when compared with income levels as
seen in table 4-19 below. A post hoc test was not run and because of the results, the null
hypothesis H0 will not be rejected.

Income Analysis

F Value

P > F Value

Cat 1 Scores

1.12

0.3522

Cat 2 Scores

1.70

0.1229

Cat 3 Scores

0.31

0.9335

Table 4-19: Category 1, 2 and 3 scores when running a one-way Anova on gross income
brackets

An overall analysis of the results from the income demographic can be seen in table 420.
Income – Analysis

P Value

Statistically

Reject H0

Significant
Total Test Scores

0.7057

No

No

Category 1 Scores

0.3522

No

No

Category 2 Scores

0.1229

No

No

Category 3 Scores

0.9335

No

No

Table 4-20: Analysis of results among income regarding the four test scores

Hypothesis 5
A one-way Anova was conducted to determine if occupation or being a student had an
effect on a user’s vulnerability to phishing. Participants were classified into eight fields
as previously mentioned (n = number of participants).


Agriculture (n = 4)



Business/Finance (n = 73)



Education (n = 14)



Healthcare (n = 17)



Information Technology (n = 51)



Manufacturing (n = 8)
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Media (n = 10)



Student (n = 12)

The large distributional difference and varying sample sizes between the occupation
demographics as seen above raises issues when employing a statistical model. Various
studies highlight the importance of an evenly distributed sample size in order to properly
infer results (Button et al., 2013). Button et al., (2013), states, “Low statistical power
undermines the purpose of scientific research; it reduces the chance of detecting a true
effect”. Statistical power is affected primarily by the size of the sample used to detect
it9. Due to this, it will be difficult to rely on these results and generalise them onto a
larger population.
The fifth hypothesis of this study is highlighted below:
Hypothesis 5:
H0: When given a quiz, there is no difference in the mean test scores between
occupations or students as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack.
H5: When given a quiz, there is a difference in the mean test scores between
occupations or students as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack.
Total Test Scores
There was a statistically significant difference between the total test score when
compared with occupation (F = 2.89, p = 0.0069***). With the p value registering below
the significance value of .05, a post hoc test was run to get a better understanding of how
the specific groups differed. The Tukey post hoc test revealed that vulnerability to
phishing was significantly higher in the Business and Finance occupation when
compared with Information Technology (.9481 ± .305, p = 0.044*). There were no other
statistically significant results returned from the post hoc test. From these results, the
null hypothesis H0 will be rejected and the alternative hypothesis H5 will be accepted.

Category 1 Test Scores:
For category one test scores, there was not a statistically significant difference when
comparing different occupations (F = 0.81, p = 0.5794). No post hoc test was run due to

9

https://effectsizefaq.com/2010/05/31/what-is-statistical-power/
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the p value registering higher than the significance level of .05. With these results, the
null hypothesis H0 will not be rejected.

Category 2 Test Scores:
There was not a statistically significant difference when comparing category two test
scores with the different occupations (F = 0.85, p = 0.5513). No post hoc test was run
due to the p value registering higher than the significance level of .05. With these results,
the null hypothesis H0 will not be rejected.

Category 3 Test Scores:
There was a statistically significant difference between the category three test scores
when compared with occupation (F = 4.56, p = 0.0001***). The post hoc test revealed
that the Business and Finance occupation is more vulnerable to content spoofing when
compared with Information Technology professionals as seen in table 4-21. This
coincides with the results from the total test scores. It can also be seen that Education
professionals were more vulnerable to content spoofing when compared with both
Information Technology and Media professionals. From these results, the null
hypothesis H0 will be rejected and the alternative hypothesis H1 will be accepted.
Occupation Cat 3 Statistics

P Value

Contrast ± Std. Err.

IT vs Bus/Finance

0.001***

.710 ± .172

IT vs Education

0.004***

1.105 ± .285

Media vs Education

0.019**

1.328 ± .391

Table 4-21: Statistically significant results for the occupation demographic when analysing
their category 3 test scores

The results obtained from the occupation demographic are highlighted in Table 4-22
below.
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Occupation

P Value

Statistically

Reject H0

Significant

Analysis
Total Test Scores

0.0069***

Yes

Yes (Accept H1)

Category 1 Scores

0.5794

No

No

Category 2 Scores

0.5513

No

No

Category 3 Scores

0.0001***

Yes

Yes (Accept H1)

Table 4-22: Analysis of results among occupation/students regarding the four test scores

4.7 Conclusion
This chapter outlined the implementation and results from the statistical analysis. A
breakdown of the demographic distribution was highlighted, showing how respondents
were spread between the different groups. The noteworthy descriptive statistics were
presented, which allowed initial observations to be made before the statistical models
were run across the data. The method for how the data was cleaned and coded so it could
be imported into STATA was also introduced. Finally, the theoretical approach was
undertaken, running the two-sample t-test and one-way Anova models across the results
of the survey in order to see if there was a statistically significant outcome. From these
results, each of the five hypotheses were answered.
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5

Analysis, Evaluation and Discussion

5.1 Introduction
This chapter will discuss the results obtained in chapter four compared with what is
already known. Whether the results of this project coincide or refute previous studies
will be addressed and reasons for these results are discussed.
Gender
Previous research has found mixed results when analysing phishing vulnerability among
gender (Kumaraguru et al., 2009a; Sheng et al., 2010). Some studies concluded that there
was no significant difference among gender in the tendency to fall for phishing emails
(Kumaraguru et al., 2009a), while others established women as the more vulnerable
gender (Sheng et al., 2010). The findings from this study illustrate that there is no
statistically significant difference between males and females when comparing their
vulnerability to phishing as a whole or through email and smishing. This indicates that
neither males nor females are more vulnerable to phishing when analysing the above
three categories. However, when considering the category 3 scores, women appear to be
more susceptible to content spoofing when compared to men. These results would
suggest that females are more vulnerable than males at falling for content spoofing
phishing attacks. Perhaps this could be contributed to women’s tendency to be more
trustworthy of web content, as suggested in a study by Gavett et al., (2017).
Age
All of the previous research undertaken appears to highlight that younger adults, mainly
in the 18-25 age group are the most vulnerable to phishing attacks (Gavett et al., 2017;
Kumaraguru et al., 2009a; Sheng et al., 2010). From the results obtained in Chapter
4.6.2, it was concluded that the 56 + age group was the most vulnerable to being phished
when analysing participants total test scores. This can be seen not only when examining
the mean and standard deviation values but also when using a post hoc test to compare
vulnerability between all age groups.
Following on from this, a consistent pattern emerges when analysing the category one,
two and three test scores of each age group. It was observed that the 46-55 age group
was more vulnerable to email phishing when compared with the 36-45 group for
category one test scores. For category two scores, the 46-55 age group was again more
vulnerable to being caught out via smishing when compared against the 18-25 age group.
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Finally, when analysing category three test scores, vulnerability to content spoofing was
significantly higher in the 36-45 and 56 + age groups compared to the 26-35 age group.
All of these results appear to indicate that older adults above the age of 36 are more
vulnerable than younger adults to being phished in all categories that were analysed.
This goes against the findings from previous work already obtained and may be down
to a number of factors. Potential explanations for this include that older individuals are
not as well informed or experienced with technology. Younger adults who grow up with
a multitude of technology at their fingertips are more likely to be able to identify a
spoofed phishing request through experience and knowledge. This same concept can be
thought for smishing vulnerability as many of the younger participants may be more
experienced with their mobile phones and can identify the phishing attempts easier.
Education
In the limited research that has been carried out to analyse education levels and
vulnerability to phishing, Dhamija et al., (2006), concluded that there was “no
significant correlation between education level and scores”. However, when analysis is
performed on the results of this survey, a different outcome is presented. For total test
scores, there was a very statistically significant difference when comparing education
levels. From the results obtained, participants with no degree i.e. those who selected
“none of these” within the survey were most vulnerable to phishing. In fact, there was a
direct correlation between low-test scores and no degree when analysing the mean and
standard deviation as well as running the one-way Anova. Furthermore, vulnerability to
phishing was significantly higher in the no degree group when compared with those who
have Level 6, Level 7 and Level 8 education.
There are a number of potential explanations for these results. Perhaps participants who
do not have a degree are in the first years of third level education. Those who have
completed higher-level education potentially have access to greater information
technology and education resources. There has been no other research into the influence
of education on vulnerability to phishing. This would suggest a gap in the literature and
understanding into the relationship between this demographic, and suggests the need for
further research.
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Income
Previous research suggest that there is no evidence linking a high income with an
increased vulnerability to being phished (Leukfeldt 2014). The findings from this study
coincide with previous research, as there were no statistically significant differences
between income levels and test scores.
Given these results, phishing is portrayed in a slightly darker, more ruthless light because
it is deemed that no one is safe. Leukfeldt (2014) stated “An unemployed person on a
shoestring budget or a director of a multinational company: everyone has an equal
chance of becoming a victim.”
Occupation/Student
From the previous research that was reviewed, it revealed that students were more prone
to phishing attacks when compared against working professionals (Metzger, Flanagin,
& Zwarun 2003; Mohebzada et al., 2012). Mohebzada et al., (2012) concluded,
“Experience could be a factor in victimising an individual during a social engineering
attack”. The results from the analysis go against these findings, as there is no statistically
significant difference between students and any of the occupations when comparing their
vulnerability to phishing across all categories. Each of the student participants were
identified as being in the 18-25 age group. With this information, a correlation could be
suggested with the age demographic results in chapter 5.1.2. The results found younger
participants less likely to be phished when compared with older adults, which could be
a result of information technology experience and knowledge.
It was difficult to locate any peer-reviewed literature that compared and contrasted
different occupations and their vulnerability to phishing. Due to this, there are no studies
that can be referenced against the results of this project. For total test scores and category
three test scores, there was a statistically significant difference when comparing test
scores and occupation. It transpired that Business and Finance professionals could be
considered as more vulnerable to being phished when compared with Information
Technology professionals. These findings suggest that IT professionals are more aware
of attempted phishing attacks which could be attributed to industry knowledge and
experience. For category three results, respondents who are in education were also seen
as more vulnerable to phishing attacks when compared with IT professionals. Education
professionals were also seen as more vulnerable, when compared with Media
professionals, to content spoofing attacks.
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5.2 Conclusion
This chapter reviewed the results of the analysis obtained in chapter four and identified
whether they agreed or contested findings of previous studies. Finally, a discussion on
why these results were obtained was introduced.
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6

Conclusion and Future Work

6.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews the objectives and limitations of the research, the contributions to
the body of knowledge and any recommendations for future work that may be
undertaken.

6.2 Research Overview and Problem Definition
The objective of this research project was to answer the following research question:
Are members of demographic groups more vulnerable to being exploited by a particular
category of phishing attack?
The emphasis of the study was focused on three types of phishing, which are currently
viewed as some of the most prevalent and dangerous. Measuring a user’s vulnerability
to a specific type of phishing is an important aspect in order to help mitigate against its
threat. If it is clear who is most vulnerable to a specific type of phishing attack, it is
possible that more secure methods of anti-phishing training and awareness could be
introduced to reduce the quantity of successful attacks.
Quantitative research was performed in order to statistically analyse if particular
members of a demographic group were more vulnerable to a specific type of phishing.
The primary data gathered from the survey was analysed using statistical tools in order
to identify if a statistically significant result was obtained.

6.3 Limitations of Research
Undertaking a study of this size can introduce limitations that may potentially halt or
hinder the research.


One of the main limitations experienced during the course of this study was a
lack of previous research when analysing demographic vulnerability to phishing.
Although there were a handful of studies that could be used to aid the research,
the small amount of information affected the discussion when considering results
against the backdrop of previous literature.



A limitation encountered when performing the analysis was a lack of cross
analysis between demographics. The statistical analysis performed looked at
singular demographics and the members within them but no analysis was
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undertaken to consider how multiple demographics may affect vulnerability to
phishing.


A true random sample would have been helped to increase the likelihood that the
results will accurately reflect the entire population (Brant, Haas-Haseman, Wei,
Wickham, & Ponto 2015).

6.4 Contributions and Impact
This dissertation focused on identifying differences that exist among five demographics
to determine which members are the most vulnerable to being exploited by a particular
type of phishing. As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, no study has been undertaken
to determine what types of phishing are the most successful at exploiting users. The
results from this study were able to identify which members of a demographic group
were vulnerable to a specific kind of phishing.
As previously mentioned, the lack of literature to examine demographic vulnerability
has limited this study when discussing the results. Therefore, the findings from this study
are significantly relevant to examining which members of a demographic group are
vulnerable to phishing. This study is expected to contribute the results, conclusions and
recommendations to the information security body of knowledge. It is hoped that this
material will aid future researchers as well as contribute to other studies in this field.

6.5 Future Work & Recommendations
There are gaps in the literature to suggest that future work is needed in order to
continuously monitor user’s vulnerability to new and improved phishing attacks.


One area where future research regarding demographic phishing vulnerability
can benefit from is cross analysis. The use of regression analysis between
demographics can help to determine what characteristics make users vulnerable.
In the context of this study, it could be used to determine what combination of
demographics make a user the most vulnerable e.g. 56 + year old males who
works in the Business and Finance industry.



In light of these results, another potential area of future work is to use these
findings in order to develop innovative ways to help stop phishing attacks. This
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study highlights who is at risk but a deeper study is required in order to leverage
these findings and come up with innovative ways to mitigate phishing attacks.

6.6 Final Thoughts
The results from this study clearly highlight that phishing is still as deceitful and
dangerous as ever; with the average total test score being 72%. Although this may seem
like a good score in academic terms, it only takes one phishing fraud to potentially cause
massive harm to a victim both financially and emotionally. It is important that studies
like these continue to be undertaken so consistent and up to date information can be
gathered. The results obtained from additional studies can be used to inform antiphishing work groups, educate people about the dangers of phishing and help mitigate
against future attacks.
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Appendix B - Descriptive Statistics
Gender
Gender – Total Scores
Table B-1 shows the descriptive statistics for gender cross tabulated with their total test
scores.
Male

Female

Total Quiz Scores

1021

1045

Participants

92

97

Mean

11.09

10.77

Sample SD, s

1.59

1.83

Table B-1: Descriptive statistics of the total test scores for gender

Gender – Category 1 Scores
Table B-2 shows the descriptive statistics for gender cross tabulated with their category
one test scores.
Male

Female

Category 1 Scores

339

375

Participants

92

97

Mean

3.68

3.86

Sample SD, s

1.03

0.99

Table B-2: Descriptive statistics of the category 1 test scores for gender

Gender – Category 2 Scores
Table B-3 shows the descriptive statistics for gender cross tabulated with their category
two test scores.
Male

Female

Category 2 Scores

412

426

Participants

92

97

Mean

4.47

4.39

Sample SD, s

0.63

0.78

Table B-3: Descriptive statistics of the category 2 test scores for gender
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Gender – Category 3 Scores
Table B-4 shows the descriptive statistics for gender cross tabulated with their category
three test scores.
Male

Female

Category 3 Scores

270

244

Participants

92

97

Mean

2.93

2.51

Sample SD, s

1.04

0.92

Table B-4: Descriptive statistics of the category 3 test scores for genders

Age
Age – Total scores
Table B-5 shows the descriptive statistics for age cross tabulated with their total test
scores.
18 - 25

26 - 35

36 - 45

46 - 55

56 +

Total Quiz Scores

585

603

416

337

125

Participants

53

52

38

33

13

Mean

11.03

11.59

10.94

10.21

9.61

Sample SD, s

1.77

1.50

1.55

1.62

1.59

Table B-5: Descriptive statistics of the total test scores for age

Age – Category 1 scores
Table B-6 shows the descriptive statistics for age cross tabulated with their category 1
test scores.
18 - 25

26 - 35

36 - 45

46 - 55

56 +

Category 1 Scores

192

208

157

114

43

Participants

53

52

38

33

13

Mean

3.62

4

4.13

3.45

3.30

Sample SD, s

1.10

0.89

0.86

1.01

0.91

Table B-6: Descriptive statistics of the category 1 test scores for age
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Age – Category 2 scores
Table B-7 shows the descriptive statistics for age cross tabulated with their category 2
test scores.
18 - 25

26 - 35

36 - 45

46 - 55

56 +

Category 2 Scores

246

233

170

135
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Participants

53

52

38

33

13

Mean

4.64

4.48

4.47

4.09

4.15

Sample SD, s

0.55

0.69

0.59

0.89

0.76

Table B- 7: Descriptive statistics of the category 2 test scores for age

Age – Category 3 scores
Table B-7 shows the descriptive statistics for age cross tabulated with their category 3
test scores.
18 - 25

26 - 35

36 - 45

46 - 55

56 +

Category 3 Scores

147

162

89

88

28

Participants

53

52

38

33

13

Mean

2.77

3.11

2.3

2.66

2.15

Sample SD, s

1.05

1.01

0.13

0.87

0.76

Table B- 8: Descriptive statistics of the category 3 test scores for age
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Education
Education – Total scores
Table B-9 shows the descriptive statistics for education cross tabulated with their total
test scores.
Level 5

Level 6

Level 7

Level 8

No Degree

Total Quiz Scores

245

863

557

206

195

Participants

24

77

50

18

20

Mean

10.20

11.20

11.14

11.44

9.75

Sample SD, s

2.18

1.64

2.32

1.90

1.58

Table B- 9: Descriptive statistics of the total test scores for education

Education – Category 1 scores
Table B-10 shows the descriptive statistics for education cross tabulated with their
category 1 test scores.
Level 5

Level 6

Level 7

Level 8

No Degree

Category 1 Scores

83

299

197

68

67

Participants

24

77

50

18

20

Mean

3.45

3.88

3.94

3.77

3.35

Sample SD, s

1.28

0.99

0.91

0.80

1.03

Table B- 10: Descriptive statistics of the category 1 test scores for education

Education – Category 2 scores
Table B-11 shows the descriptive statistics for education cross tabulated with their
category 2 test scores.
Level 5

Level 6

Level 7

Level 8

No Degree

Category 2 Scores

107

345

220

85

81

Participants

24

77

50

18

20

Mean

4.45

4.48

4.4

4.72

4.05

Sample SD, s

0.5

0.6

0.728

0.46

0.88

Table B- 11: Descriptive statistics of the category 2 test scores for education
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Education – Category 3 scores
Table B-12 shows the descriptive statistics for education cross tabulated with their
category 3 test scores.
Level 5

Level 6

Level 7

Level 8

No Degree

Category 3 Scores

55

219

140

53

47

Participants

24

77

50

18

20

Mean

2.29

2.84

2.8

2.94

2.35

Sample SD, s

1.04

0.87

1.06

1.05

0.87

Table B- 12: Descriptive statistics of the category 3 test scores for education

Income
Income – Total scores
Table B-13 shows the descriptive statistics for income cross tabulated with their total
test scores.
0-20k

20-30k

30-40k

40-50k

50-60k

60k +

Not
Disclosed

Total Quiz

199

312

472

321

239

288

235

Participants

18

30

43

29

22

26

21

Mean

11.05

10.4

10.97

11.89

10.86

11.076

11.190

Sample SD, s

3.11

2.35

1.48

1.53

1.67

1.74

1.47

Scores

Table B- 13: Descriptive statistics of the total test scores for income
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Income – Category 1 scores
Table B-14 shows the descriptive statistics for income cross tabulated with their category
1 test scores.
0-20k

20-30k

30-40k

40-50k

50-60k

60k +

Not
Disclosed

Category 1

68

103

166

115

79

104

79

Participants

18

30

43

29

22

26

21

Mean

3.77

3.43

3.86

3.96

3.59

4

3.761

Sample SD, s

1.24

1.25

0.9

0.86

0.95

1.01

0.94

Scores

Table B- 14: Descriptive statistics of the category 1 test scores for income

Income – Category 2 scores
Table B-15 shows the descriptive statistics for income cross tabulated with their category
2 test scores.
0-20k

20-30k

30-40k

40-50k

50-60k

60k +

Not
Disclosed

Category 2

86

130

185

129

99

111

98

Participants

18

30

43

29

22

26

21

Mean

4.77

4.333

4.302

4.44

4.5

4.26

4.66

Sample SD, s

0.42

0.42

0.74

0.63

0.80

0.82

0.57

Scores

Table B- 15: Descriptive statistics of the category 2 test scores for income
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Income – Category 3 scores
Table B-16 shows the descriptive statistics for income cross tabulated with their category
3 test scores.
0-20k

20-30k

30-40k

40-50k

50-60k

60k +

Not Disclosed

Category 3 Scores

45

79

121

77

61

73

58

Participants

18

30

43

29

22

26

21

Mean

2.5

2.63

2.81

2.65

2.77

2.80

2.7

Sample SD, s

0.92

1.15

0.90

0.81

1.03

1.05

1.26

Table B- 16: Descriptive statistics of the category 3 test scores for income

Occupation/Student
Occupation/Student – Total scores
Table B-17 shows the descriptive statistics for occupation cross tabulated with their total
test scores.
Agri

Bus

Edu

Health

IT

Manu

Media

Student

Total Quiz Scores

36

771

144

191

587

85

116

136

Participants

4

73

14

17

51

8

10

12

Mean

9

10.56

10.28

11.23

11.0

10.6

11.6

11.33

Sample SD, s

2.94

1.73

1.63

4.69

1.30

0.74

1.57

1.92

Table B- 17: Descriptive statistics of the total test scores for occupation

Occupation/Student – Category 1 scores
Table B-18 shows the descriptive statistics for occupation cross tabulated with their
category 1 test scores.
Agri

Bus

Edu

Health

IT

Manu

Media

Student

Category 1 Scores

11

275

52

66

198

31

35

46

Participants

4

73

14

17

51

8

10

12

Mean

2.75

3.76

3.71

3.88

3.88

3.87

3.5

3.83

Sample SD, s

2.06

0.99

0.99

1.05

0.90

0.99

0.97

1.26

Table B- 18: Descriptive statistics of the category 1 test scores for occupation
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Occupation/Student – Category 2 scores
Table B-19 shows the descriptive statistics for occupation cross tabulated with their
category 2 test scores.
Agri

Bus

Edu

Health

IT

Manu

Media

Student

Category 1 Scores

17

316

63

78

227

34

47

56

Participants

4

73

14

17

51

8

10

12

Mean

4.0

4.32

4.5

4.58

4.45

4.25

4.7

4.66

Sample SD, s

0.95

0.8

0.65

0.79

0.6

0.70

0.48

0.49

Table B- 19: Descriptive statistics of the category 2 test scores for occupation

Occupation/Student – Category 3 scores
Table B-20 shows the descriptive statistics for occupation cross tabulated with their
category 3 test scores.
Agri

Bus

Edu

Health

IT

Manu

Media

Student

Category 1 Scores

8

180

29

47

162

20

34

34

Participants

4

73

14

17

51

8

10

12

Mean

2

2.46

2.07

2.76

3.17

2.5

3.4

2.83

Sample SD, s

0

0.92

0.82

0.97

0.99

0.75

0.96

1.11

Table B- 20: Descriptive statistics of the category 3 test scores for occupation
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